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Abstract
The article reflects on digitality and interface design in
terms of the multiple senses of touch. Touching is
presented as a ‘‘pathic’’ sense of being exposed, which
implies that touching exceeds the tactile and even the
phenomenal world. A particular focus is set on Aristotle’s
and Husserl’s ways of thematizing the sense of touch. In
this way, two extremes of the phenomenological thinking
of touching are articulated: touching as an indistinct and
heterogeneous constituent of sensitivity and touching as
the guarantor of immediacy of the sense experience.
Referring to Derrida’s critical notes concerning hapto-
centrism, the article attempts to problematize the hand
and the finger as phenomenological figures of touch and as
holds of haptic realism. The article concludes that insofar
as digital interface design aims at haptic realism it
conceives of the sense of touch in terms of narcissistic
feedback and thus tends to conceal the pathic moment of
touching.
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Our modern technological environment is largely
built on finger-friendly touch points. From day to
day, we finger various devices, and today their
switches, buttons, levers and adjusters are more
and more often digitalised. They are icons on
some type of display and all we need to control
them is a light tap or sweep of our finger. Thus,
the finger can take care of a multiplicity of tasks
that earlier required the whole hand or some other
part of the body. At the same time, these tasks
increasingly begin to resemble each other, at least
as far as the skills required of the finger are
concerned. Therefore we might say that the
technology of our time is characterised by
digitality even in the etymological sense of the
word ‘‘digital’’, since the term used for discrete
units derives from the Latin word for finger,
digitus, that itself is now becoming something
like a discrete unit. At the same time, digital
technology brings different media contents to our
fingertips by discreetly covering its code.
It is customary to speak of the digitalisation of
different media. It seems, however, that along with
digital technology, even the finger has become
‘‘digitalised’’. It has become an increasingly auton-
omous unit in relation to the skills of hand and
body and its functions can be modelled and
transferred to new contexts. Small movements of
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the finger have as good as limitless possibilities of
creating a multitude of things*even ‘‘in real
time’’, i.e. from a distance beyond the bodily
horizon without any significant delay. These taps,
pushes and sweeps challenge in many ways the
familiar concretia of the world and invite us to
develop ever more comprehensive or, more ex-
actly put, more multiform user interfaces: rather
than immersive systems, recent development has
moved in the direction of sensory enhancement
and mixed reality.1 In the last few years, accus-
tomed graphic interfaces have been accompanied
by multimodal and tangible user interfaces.2
The finger has been handed the status of a
switch. But the finger now seems to be dragging
the whole body along. The recent popularity of
various so-called wearables and computer games
requiring bodily participation, such as Nintendo
Wii, seems to point towards this. Will the ‘‘digi-
talisation’’ of the finger lead to a ‘‘digitalisation’’ of
the whole body and its becoming an incarnation of
its own modellings?
With haptic user interfaces which enable bodily
interaction with information technology, the body
is opened a new type of touch to itself as well as to
objects and other bodies. Virtually nothing seems
to be beyond reach. With just a tap, we can
connect to our friends or colleagues across the
globe and share various activities in real time and
thus keep ourselves in touch. We can manipulate
physical objects across long distances; change, for
example, the viewing angle of a web camera
somewhere in the world. New media applications
may also build into virtual social networks where
touch is used*either personalised or anonymous-
ly*from problem solving to affective aims, such
as stress therapy.3 In short, digital technology
involves touch in multiple senses and configura-
tions. How are these figures of touch constituted?
Do they share a common denominator?
THE COMPLEXITY OF TOUCH
To approach these questions we will need to
discuss touch and sensation in a field that is
broader than the physical sense of touching. The
nature of touching has been a moot point in
western thinking of touch. Different conceptual
articulations and arguments, however, almost
invariably share the idea that touching is a way
of locating and guaranteeing the contact between
different elements of experience. Thus reality has
been understood as being in touch with something
real. The matter is further complicated by the fact
that the different parties to this contact have many
names in our tradition: soul, mind, psyche, reason
versus body, flesh, sensuality, etc. Correspond-
ingly, the contact itself has been studied from the
point of view of religion, intuition, reflection and
synapses.
In the experiential horizon of digital technology,
the status of touch as a guarantor of tangible
reality would appear unstable, as a great deal of
what we consider real is anything but tangible,
even when we find it touching. The question
arises, how to relate tangibility to the conceptual,
affective and mental dimensions of touch or feel.
As we embark on a study of the multidimen-
sional role of the reality of touch, we find good
reason to return to Aristotle’s treatise on the soul,
De Anima. It is, after all, considered a central work
where the heterogeneity of touch is made into a
far-reaching philosophical problem.4 Aristotle’s
way of inquiring into touch helps us re-evaluate
the questions of sensing which place themselves in
the centre of media theoretical discussions.
Another apt reference point for assessing the
relationship between touch and the media is
provided by the phenomenological analysis of
touch included in Husserl’s Ideen II.5 Husserl’s
inquiries into the role of touch in the constitution
of sensory certainty open up fecund perspectives
into digital media technology. The way Husserl
outlines the boundary conditions of the interplay
of hand and eye is of particular interest in this
respect.
With the help of Aristotle and Husserl we can
pinpoint the two extremes in the phenomenologi-
cal thinking of touch: touch as a heterogeneous
field and touch as the guarantor of sensory
certainty.
To Aristotle, the soul is the cause and essence of
the living body.6 The question how life manifests
itself in the body leads him to a discussion on
embodiment. Thus his treatise De Anima ulti-
mately deals with the mind-body relation-
ship*the body as the scene of life.
Aristotle introduces his points of departure by
stating that that which has a soul is distinguished
from that which has not by sensation and move-
ment.7 Life is characterised by sensing, but the
only sense that is indispensable to all animals is
M. Elo
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the sense of touch: ‘‘some classes of animals have
all the senses, some only certain of them, others
only one, the most indispensable, touch’’.8 The
vital role of touch is above all related to the ability
to feel pleasure and pain and the ability to seek
and find nutrition.9 As such sensitivity, touch
plays its part not only in all sensing but also in
thinking. In its diversity it constitutes a tough
challenge for philosophy. Aristotle sees the sensory
status of touch as highly problematic: ‘‘It is a
problem whether touch is a single sense or a group
of senses. It is also a problem, what is the organ of
touch’’.10 The ability of sensation, which even the
simplest of animals possess, is itself anything but
simple. Its structure is difficult to get hold of; it
slips through our fingers.
The difficulty of defining the sense of touch
discovered by Aristotle has accompanied western
philosophy of touch up to our days. It is not clear
how the heterogeneous elements of touch brought
up by Aristotle should be related to each other.
The problem does not lie in the way Aristotle
poses the questions but in the fact that touch
cannot be thematized as a sense in the same way
as the exemplary sense of sight, for instance, can
be. The objects of touch are many, and it has no
clearly definable organ. Touch is in many ways
more complex and comprehensive than the other
sensory forms. As touch and feel it is indispen-
sable to all animals and belongs inseparably to the
living body without, however, being the faculty of
any particular body part. Nor can touch be clearly
defined as a sense modality. What can be felt as
touch are not only certain sensual qualities but
anything and everything that can be felt and
sensed by the body. The difficulty of drawing lines
between the different sensory modalities finds its
culmination point here, as bright light, for exam-
ple, may cause quite ‘‘palpable’’ pain. A similar
challenge of distinction is posed by such inter-
modal phenomena as the feeling of emptiness.11
The Finnish verb tuntea used for touch-sensa-
tions combines the meanings of ‘‘touch’’, ‘‘feel-
ing’’ and ‘‘knowledge’’ and is thus an excellent
example of how obscure the boundaries between
the three are from the viewpoint of body as the
scene of life. Touch, feeling and recognition are
mixed and implicate a sentience that can be
articulated as either cognitive apprehension or an
affective tone.12 The Finnish verb tarttua
(‘‘grasp’’, ‘‘catch’’, ‘‘apprehend’’, ‘‘seize’’) also
points towards the many aspects of touch. The
verb is a combination of grabbing and holding
firmly as well as being exposed to catching
diseases or other people’s moods. A hand, dirt,
disease, laughter and various fancies may be
caught and catching in different ways. The theme
of touch also locks together the biological, psy-
chophysical and affective dimensions of attach-
ment and rejection.
As a consequence of the difficulty of defining
touch, with which Aristotle struggled, the relation-
ship between the sense of touch and cognition has
become ambivalent. As a sense touch has been
considered too complex and obscure to be able to
offer a clear model for cognitive classifications,
which have traditionally been grounded on visual
logic. On the other hand, we rely on Aristotle’s
classifications even in the division into five senses
where the sense of touch has its place like the
thumb in the hand. This ‘‘full hand’’ of the five
senses has been apt to tame the structural hetero-
geneity of touch that threatens cognitive dis-
course. It has made it possible to present touch
as a sense that can serve cognitive interests by
guaranteeing an immediate, hands-on touch with
reality. This has led into the most primitive of the
senses being regarded as the guarantor of optic
intuition, promise of immediate experience and
support of conscious thought.13
Aristotle’s attitude to the theme of touch is
ambivalent, to be sure. On the one hand, because
of its complexity and comprehensiveness, touch
becomes in his discourse a factor that determines
all sensing: ‘‘All the other organs of sense, no
doubt, perceive by contact, only the contact is
mediate’’.14 On the other hand, Aristotle wants to
hold on to the specificity of the sense of touch. He
claims that Democritus and most of the natural
philosophers when treating of sense perception
proceed quite irrationally, for they ‘‘represent all
objects of sense as objects of Touch. Yet, if this is
really so, it clearly follows that each of the other
senses is a mode of Touch’’.15 Aristotle’s classifi-
cation is not free from conflict, but it should be
noted that, as far as natural philosophers are
concerned, he mainly criticises the conception of
touch based on material contact. As will later
become obvious, touch is for Aristotle a factor
that determines all sense perception specifically
because of the structure of sentience.
Digital finger
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What brings the heterogeneous elements of
touch together has later been sought in different
places. In the Husserlian tradition, the structures
of experience and perception take the central
stage. Modern neurophysiological research which
focuses on vital functions rather than perceptual
experience has, for its part, chopped the sense of
touch into neurophysiological subsystems deter-
mined by different receptors (temperature, move-
ment, pain, balance, etc.).16 The difficulties of
defining touch are also repeated in neurophysiol-
ogy: efforts to locate the subsystems as clearly
defined representations in the cortex that would
be comparable with the centres of sight and
hearing, have so far failed.17 Touch has further-
more been studied as a psychological and social
phenomenon, where it is taken in a broader sense
than physical contact, though related to it. In this
research, the central question is tact.18 Touch also
has its place in western theology.19 It may even be
said that the Christian religion is a religion of
touch, because it is centred on the mystery of the
touch of spirit and flesh. It is also noteworthy that
the relationship with the sacred in general is
defined by prohibitions and restrictions concern-
ing touch. In short, we have a great number of
possible approaches to touch at our disposal.
Considering our current experiential horizon of
media technology where the relationship between
physical and mental contact becomes an increas-
ingly challenging question, it would seem to make
sense to try to think of the heterogeneous elements
of touch as a whole. However, the aporetic
structure of touch defies definition, regardless of
what we choose as the basis of explanation. Where
to look for the common denominator for the
various senses of touch? Perhaps what is to be
studied is not a family of phenomena after all, but
a logic that links together different*possibly even
incommensurable*phenomena but itself only
comes within the sphere of phenomena through
its effects?
Even the way in which the heterogeneous
elements of touch are articulated in language
would seem to take us to the reverse side of
phenomena. Sight upholds metaphors of light that
outline the phenomenal world cognitively, thus
creating the basis for a uniform discourse on truth.
Touch, by contrast, does not similarly articulate
discourse in a form manageable by means of
metaphors. Rather, it dismantles, decomposes
and differentiates language. While metaphors of
light produce continuity and uniformity, i.e. home-
ostasis, the effects of touch represent a diastasis of
language.20 We are literally dealing with a spatio-
temporal dislocation of the processes of significa-
tion (dia*‘‘separate’’, stasis*‘‘localisation’’) in
the structures, accents and rhythms of language.
In this dislocation, touch is not reduced to a
cognitive grasp. Instead of ‘‘catching’’ in the sense
of apprehending it is characterised by ‘‘catching’’
in the sense of being exposed.
Considering the difficulty of classifying and
analysing the different forms of touch, we ought
to be prepared for the multiplicity of the affective
aspects of touch. Touch exceeds the tactile world;
touch is more than the sense of touch. It is not
only a matter of contacting surfaces, it also has
depth: something can be so touching that a human
being or an animal is thoroughly moved. It is an
exposure to something excessive and unexpected
which may leave a painful mark. When we
acknowledge that experience in all its forms is
marked by such a rupture or pathic moment,21 the
opportunity opens to think of touch at the level
marked by Aristotle’s treatise. Touch turns out to
be a complex field of sensing and feeling, in a
word, sentience. But what logic does the pathic
moment of touching follow?
SELF-SENSE AND SENSORY
SENSITIVITY
To Aristotle, sense perception involves the mea-
surement of the threats and possibilities related to
the limits of self-preservation: life means taking
risks.22 Developing this Aristotelian line of
thought further Thomas Aquinas states that sense
perception only takes place in the midst of bodies,
under the threat of mixture.23 As far as sensing is
exposure to risk, it also always relies on others.
Touch explores the borderline between what is
experienced as one’s own and another’s.
In Stoic philosophy this borderline was con-
ceptualised as the economy of the differentiation
of life processes. One of the far-reaching implica-
tions of this Stoic standpoint is the insight that life
is actualised and appropriated within the frame-
work of corporeal possibilities. The sense of self
the Stoics described by the terms synaisthesis
(‘‘joint sense’’) and constitutio (‘‘setting up to-
gether’’), and the process of its development by
M. Elo
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the word oikeiosis, which means appropriation, a
process where a being attempts to attain its own
proper nature. The underlying words are oikos,
house, and oikia, belonging to a house (as distinct
from allotrios, alien, not belonging to the house).
Oikos is also the root word for economy. Self-
sense, oikeiosis, is animal self-preservation, self-
maintenance and the economy of the self. In the
Stoic idea of life’s economy, self-sense also char-
acterises the perceptual world of animals. An
animal does not know that it is of a certain kind,
but it does possess some kind of pre-sapient sense
of its own limits and constitution. In this sense its
life is a ‘‘self-project’’.24
The scene of life is differentiated into a body,
which can feel pain and pleasure in many ways
and find the nutrition it needs. Turning to one’s
self, the ‘‘self project’’, is appropriation of what is
within reach, touching one’s self through the
other. This means that the self cannot establish
itself, but is always preceded by another, both
logically and historically. The beginning of self-
hood is an enigma, as enigmatic as birth, which is
a continuous emerging from nowhere. The self is
therefore not a mere question of consciousness.
Not only does its origin remain obscure and
unattainable to consciousness, but self-concern,
turning to oneself or the ‘‘self project’’ is also
obscure as to its telos, and in this sense, unending.
On the risky stage of life touching also always
means being touched, and therefore, exposure.
This reciprocal structure of touch is not, however,
symmetric but twisted out of joint by the pathic
moment. The self is always preceded by some-
thing that touches or exposes the self. We could
speak here of a horizon of encounterings.25 It is
only the pathic exposure that makes the self turn
to itself as sentient. It is worth noticing that this is
not merely a reflexive structure, as exposure
always involves the transitive formation of the
self. Jean-Luc Nancy has introduced the paradox-
ical idiom se toucher toi to describe this.26 It
implies that touch always singles out some point,
and the point it will need to make from this is still
left open. In this sense touch is not symmetrical
and self-enclosed, it has something gestural
about it.
Self-formation and the pleasure involved in it
can also be articulated in terms of autoaffection.
As distinct from an accidental or passing effect,
which anyone may be subjected to, autoaffection,
in so far as it is self-formatting, gnaws at the self
and gets delineated in the self as its relation to
itself. Life is thus actualised in the body as a
gesture, the gesture of turning towards the sensa-
tion outlined as that particular gesture*and
staying in contact with it. Referring to both Nancy
and Derrida we could say that life becomes a
question of survival, not simply in terms of a
project of self-preservation and immunisation, but
furthermore as self-exposure that involves also
autoimmune traits.27
The self does not establish itself but is formed as
gestures and exposure, in contact with others. As
self-sense, touch is therefore an alien sense in two
ways: as the ability to sense what is alien in oneself
and the ability that relies on the other and is one’s
own only secondarily.28 Although touch can mean
appropriation in that it assumes something as
proper to it, it is not primarily anyone’s own or
predictable. One might say that touch always arises
between some and in the middle of everything.
Aristotle’s analysis of sentience is illuminating
from the point of view of the formation of self-sense
and self-relationship. Sentience is to Aristotle tact
that leads to the deepening of life. Touch plays a
central role here. The characteristically human
‘‘practical reason’’ (fronesis), for example, derives
from the fact that our sense of touch is more
sensitive than other animals’.29 Aristotle analyses
the relationship between sensitivity and thought by
suggesting that hard-skinned animals are weaker
thinkers than those with a more sensitive skin.
Man’s skin is the most sensitive of all and conse-
quently, so is his thinking.30 A hard-skinned animal
meets an external threat with an either/or attitude:
it is either to be tolerated or avoided. Someone with
a sensitive skin knows several different ways of
reacting: it is possible to think and to give of
oneself. Aristotle links touch and intelligence
together even structurally: neither has a clearly
definable object nor an organ of its own. It is also
worth noting that Aristotle thinks of the self-
relationship of reason in terms of touch: thought
thinks on itself by ‘‘coming into contact with and
thinking its objects’’.31 The pathic pattern of
reliance on the other is repeated even here.
Touch also holds the key position in Aristotle’s
discussion on the structure of sensitivity:
[S]o touch has for its object both what is
tangible and what is intangible. Here by
‘‘intangible’’ is meant (a) what like air
Digital finger
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possesses some quality of tangible things in a
very slight degree and (b) what possesses it in
an excessive degree, as destructive things
do.32
Tangible and intangible are things that the sense of
touch can relate to. Aristotle recognizes a similar
structure in all sense perception. Sensing takes
place in the suspense between ‘‘contrary oppo-
sites’’ (such as light-dark, hot-cold, wet-dry, etc.).
Both excessive and insufficient intensity make it
impossible to sense differences. The capacity of
sensing can even be destroyed when borders are
crossed. In other words, sensory sensitivity is
structurally finite. It is the fragile sensitivity and
capacity of exposure awakened by contraries that
act as the enabling limits. This pathic structure
gives sense perception its measures and enables the
sensing of differences. For example, the body’s
own temperature provides a reference point for the
perception of hot and cold. This is how the causes
of pleasure, limits of tolerance and thresholds of
pain are determined.
THE ILLUSION OF IMMEDIACY
Besides taking place between contrary pairs,
sensing itself is defined by an interspace that
Aristotle describes with a word he borrows from
Democritus, metaxy, ‘‘what is in between’’.33
Aristotle starts from that ‘‘Sensation depends, as
we have said, on a process of movement or
affection from without [paskhein]’’.34 As far as
sensor and sensed are separate, there is also
something between them. And what is between
them must be something other than void, because
it must mediate the sense effect in one way or
another. Different from Democritus, Aristotle
does not believe in the possibility of remote
effect.35
According to Wolfgang Hagen, Aristotle does
not see the questions concerning sense impact as
questions of the effect that the elements or
mediating substances of some kind have on the
sense organs. This is a retroactive approach of
modern times to Aristotle’s inquiry and derives
partly from Thomas of Aquinas’s translation
where metaxy is rendered in Latin as medium.
According to Hagen, Aquinas’s translation en-
abled the formation of an ontological notion of
medium where medium has even been interpreted
as ‘‘Being’’. Thus medium could develop into a
power concept of onto-theology, which directs the
attention from the in-between to the mediating
factors or media that can be named. Yet Hagen
also says that Aristotle specifically holds on to the
‘‘anonymity’’ of the in-between.36
Thus Aristotle’s metaxy, ‘‘the in-between’’, is
not in fact an intermediary substance but the
distance structurally required by sensing, the
anonymous exteriority which does not appear as
such but produces effects in the form of sensible
differences. This interpretation is backed by
Aristotle’s use of the writing tablet metaphor in
the part concerning reason in De Anima where he
states that the mind is potentially whatever is
thinkable, though actually it is nothing until it has
thought. What it thinks must be in it ‘‘just as
characters may be said to be on a writing-
tablet’’.37
Thinking is a process where potential substance
is given an actual form. The transfer from
substance to form is qualitative rather than sub-
stantial. In other words, the effect or ‘‘being
affected’’ (paskhein) should be considered through
the development of form rather than a material
causal relationship. In the light of the writing
tablet metaphor, thinking appears as form-giving
where the objects stand out against their back-
ground just like letters do. In the parts concerning
senses Aristotle outlines a similar structure for
senses: ‘‘This [perception] is that part which is
potentially such as its object is actually’’.38 Ima-
gined and perceived differences appear as writing
on a board, thanks to the space between the
letters, the anonymous exteriority. Aristotle says
that if an object lies immediately on the surface of
a sense organ, it is not perceived at all.39 Percep-
tion requires distance, a space between. Aristotle
recognises such an in-between even in touch,
which, too ‘‘must be affected by what comes
between [...] The same, in spite of all appear-
ances, applies also to touch and taste’’.40 In other
words, not even touch, says Aristotle, is structu-
rally immediate. The fact that the sense of touch is
located inside the sensing body and not at a
distance, as it is in seeing, for example, means,
however, that the mediacy of touch escapes our
notice in sense experience. Aristotle states that
even if the surface of the body were covered with a
membrane, a kind of artificial skin, perception
would still be conveyed immediately by
touch.41 This illusion of immediacy forms the
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phenomenological basis for our belief in the
immediacy of contact.
According to Jean-Louis Chre´tien, Aristotle’s
approach to the space between even in the case of
seemingly immediate touch can be regarded as
phenomenological.42 What is involved in touch is
not an actual contact of two separate objects, or
the annulment of distance, but an experienced
distance and proximity. The space between is not
a measurable distance. Touch is where some
singular ‘‘here’’ is formed and it is only in relation
to it that distances begin to be articulated and
suspended. This suspense also involves making
sense of proximity and distance. In other words,
the ‘‘in-between’’, metaxy, is not a mere space
between, a void, but a suspension span or ‘‘back-
ground’’ as the possibility of a form.
It is noteworthy that according to Aristotle, the
potentiality of touch, sentience, differs from that
of the other senses. Sight is potentially all colours,
as it itself is without colour. Correspondingly,
hearing is potentially all sounds, as it itself is
soundless. What is sentient, by contrast, cannot be
without sensible characteristics, because it lies in
the midst of sensible qualities.43 As sentience,
therefore, touch becomes its own background, the
untouchable in the contact itself. It withdraws and
enters into the realm of appearances only secon-
darily. The sense of touch can only sense what it
itself is not, i.e. a difference. In relation to
itself*or rather, in relation to the same*it is
insentient. Also, if taken to the extremes, the sense
of touch collapses and loses its discerning ability.
On the other hand, the sense of touch can also be
multiplied in pleasure or pain as their intensity or
eroticisation. In other words, sensation by touch
requires an appropriate suspension span, for the
feeling to be able to sense that it is sensing, which
means that it only feels itself through the other,
pathically. When we consider the sensory dis-
tance, we cannot take the separateness of sensor
and sensed as our point of departure, because to
be exact, they are only articulated as such in
touch*between themselves and in the middle of
everything.
The question what should be invested in the
positions of sensor and sensed is historical. To be
able to study the suspension of sensory distance
we must take into account ‘‘phenomenotechnics’’,
i.e. the technical and technological conditions of
each particular time. The experiences of distance
and proximity are also always articulated in
relation to them. This, too, shows how the pathic
structure of touch brings out the elemental role of
technics in the construction of experience.44
SENSORY SENSITIVITY AND THE HAND
In one way or another, the hand and the skills of
the hand play a central role in as good as all
human activity and thinking. It is therefore hardly
surprising that the role of the hand has also been
central in reflections on touch. In his book on
Nancy that plumbs the theme of touch, Jacques
Derrida mentions Maine de Biran, Kant, Husserl
and Heidegger as examples of thinkers who assign
the hand a key role in the thinking of touch.45
Aristotle, who might be called a ‘‘protophenome-
nologist’’, is an interesting exception in this
tradition. It is true that Aristotle calls the hand
‘‘a tool of tools’’ saying that it has a particular
position in studies of the soul.46 He does not,
however, think of touch in terms of the figure of
the hand, as has become clear in the above.
When touch is studied as a self-relation or
constitutive moment of selfhood it is essential to
take a look at how the primary position of the
hand has been justified in each particular case. As
far as the media-technological experiential horizon
is concerned, it is particularly interesting to study
the team play of hand and eye and discuss the
reasons for its central role in a great variety of
media-technological phenomena. I will not, how-
ever, attempt to present a historical review or even
sketch the background of one; instead, I will focus
on one reference point in the phenomenological
tradition where the role of the hand in the
philosophy of touch presents itself and acts as a
catalyst to media-technological discourses. I refer
to Husserl’s analysis, which I mentioned at the
beginning of this article, the one that discusses the
significance of embodiment in the constitution of
psychic reality.47 Husserl’s way of emphasising the
status of the hand forms a clear contrast to
Aristotle’s tendency of universalising touch as
sentience.
Husserl marks the starting points of his dis-
course by making a distinction between object
(Ko¨rper) and body (Leib).48 Lifeless objects may
be related to each other spatially and, for example,
stay in touch on the basis of mere contiguousness.
Objects, however, do not sense*for that, a body
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is required. On the other hand, the sensing body
must also be an object in order to be able to sense.
Husserl writes that what is essential in the con-
stitution of the lived body is the co-constitution of
the sensing body and the object. A ‘‘corporeal
body’’ (Leibko¨rper) appears. It is both a sensing
body and an object that can be sensed just like any
other object. These two aspects are linked
together by the sense of touch thanks to its
two-sided structure. Husserl’s term for this is
Dobbelauffassung, ‘‘double apprehension’’.49 As
two-sided, touch is apprehended at the same
time both as a sensation (Empfindung) of some-
thing sensible and as sensing (Empfindnis) of the
sensing body. It is two-sided even as an experi-
ence: to touch is to become touched both as an
object and a sensing body.
This double structure does not, according to
Husserl, apply to the other senses that he dis-
cusses. He uses sight and hearing as points of
comparison. Husserl argues for the special nature
of the sense of touch on the basis of how it
localizes sensations and sensings. In touch, the
localisation is immediate, whereas it is mediated in
the other senses. Even these organs act as ‘‘fields
of localization’’ (Lokalisationsfeld), but only indir-
ectly, via the sense of touch. Visual sensations are
not localised in the eye any more than aural
sensations are localised in the ear. Only pain,
temperature, movement and other sensations of
touch can be immediately localised as sensations
in these sense organs. In their proper modalities,
sensations and sensings differ spatially. It is only
the sense of touch that can bring them together,
because there both sensation and sensing are
localised together on the spot.50
The question of localisation leads Husserl into
making a distinction between spread or distribu-
tion (Ausbreitung, Hinbreitung) and stretch or
extension (Ausdehnung): the spread of sensations
in the body is according to him different in
principle from the extent of things surrounding
the sensing body.51 The tactile sensings do not
belong to the sensuous schema at all.52 The
spread of sensations is not perceived as a spatial
and temporal whole formed by various adumbra-
tions. Consequently, the corporeal body cannot be
outlined as a clearly delineated dimensional object
on the basis of sensations alone. On the other
hand, someone whose perception is limited to the
faculty of sight would not be able to experience
her or his corporeality. He could have sensations
of the bodily object as an object but no sensation
of it as a sensing body. Husserl concludes by
stating that the body becomes a lived body ‘‘only
by incorporating tactile sensations’’.53 In the
constitution of the lived body, the spreading
body and extending object have to be congruently
superimposed in order to form a Leibko¨rper, the
localisation field of sense experience and the ‘‘zero
point of orientation’’.54
The human hand is for Husserl a hold from
which to best outline this superimposition or
‘‘double exposure’’. It is a highly sensitive and
also sufficiently ‘‘palpable’’ hold, because, differ-
ently from many other body parts, it is visible to
the bodily subject itself. It is by virtue of these
characteristics that the hand becomes for Husserl
a privileged localisation field, the metonymy of the
body. The apex of the metonymic figure is the
finger. Husserl suggests that when I touch an
object with ‘‘for example, the . . . finger’’, I sense
its texture, whereas when I shift my attention to
either hand or finger, I apprehend touch-sensings
that continue even after the actual contact. When
my right hand touches the left one the duplicity of
touch is doubled, as both the touching and
touched hand feel and sense at the same
moment.55
Like Aristotle, Husserl gives the sense of touch a
particular position in relation to self-sensing. As
with Aristotle, the theme of corporeality is central.
Differently from Aristotle, however, Husserl holds
on to*in the light of the hold offered by the
hand*the special nature and immediacy of the
sense of touch.
Derrida has shown how the hand as the figure of
touch and metonymic organ of touch par excellence
manipulates, informs and formats the thematiza-
tion of touch in Husserl’s phenomenology. Ac-
cording to Derrida, giving the hand an exemplary
status turns out to be a ‘‘properly phenomenolo-
gical gesture’’ where the hold offered by the hand
is linked to the conscious self and the subject’s
abilities. Key words here include freedom, spon-
taneity, immediacy and movement. As an exam-
ple, the role of the hand is teleological: the hand
organizes the discourse constructed on these
concepts. In this sense, the hand is also a point
of reference that imposes limitations on phenom-
enology: optic intuitionism, the human-centred
perspective and the ruling out of the technical
M. Elo
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extensions and surrogates of touch. The privilege
of the hand through which Husserl argues for the
privilege of touch is above all based on the
visibility of the hand and the seamless interplay
of hand and eye. It is on this that the idea of an
immediate and perfect presence is built. As the
metonymic figure of touch, the hand is linked to
the service of optic intuitionism. Through this
linkage, touch becomes the guarantor of sensory
certainty. It appears as the factor that constitutes
all the other senses and becomes the metonymy of
sensing: to sense  to touch. This haptocentred-
ness has been, according to Derrida, the endoske-
leton of all philosophy of touch since Aristotle.56
A closer look at Husserl’s discourse puts up the
challenge of articulating how both the sensitivity
of the hand and the interplay between hand and
eye might be considered as historical variables. By
studying the media-technological conditions of
digital touch and the ways in which the skills of
the hand are articulated in and through various
interfaces we become aware that the hand is
unstable as a metonymic figure. The apprehension
of the hand must be studied in relation to the
potentialities of the hand. For this purpose,
Derrida stresses that the possibility of a re-
articulation of such exemplary holds as the hand
is always open and follows the logic of the
supplement. With reference to the themes pre-
sented above one might say that the skills incor-
porated in the hand are determined by what lies to
hand at any given time. The apparently seamless
interplay of hand and eye makes Husserl blind to
what it is that enables the jointing of sight and
touch: the outside and the reverse side, a detour
which is needed for the seen to be recognised as
seen and a point of view to be attached to the
sensation. In other words, attribution of sensory
experience (or rather: the very possibility of
attribution) and the phenomenal difference be-
tween the inside and the outside implied by it
presuppose an elusive exteriority foreign to the
phenomenal spatiality.57 This detour implies the
possibility of replacements and mediations. Der-
rida edges the question of technology onto this
level:
[W]e have always had to treat the question of
touch within the ever-open possibility of
some figurality, some figural substitute or
supplement endlessly running toward its
‘own proper’ abyss: touching figures*and
the technical partakes of the game.58
The status of touch as sense modality and the
whole scope of its other senses is outlined by
means of the hand, finger or some other phenom-
enal figure. These points of reference relate touch
to the other senses and the technological supple-
ments of sensing. It would seem that in our digital
culture, the exemplary status of the hand is
gradually being overtaken by the digital finger,
the hand’s ‘‘own proper abyss’’. However, the
heterogeneous nature of the field of touch makes it
difficult to grasp the effects of the figural points of
reference in the philosophy of touch, for they have
to be considered from the perspective of both
language and body. An analysis of the metaphoric
exchange between discourses and bodies is in-
evitably insufficient, because the figures of touch
are not built as metaphors. Consequently, the
relationship between digitality and the finger
cannot be reduced to a metaphoric one. The
figural points of reference outlining and format-
ting the cultural status of touch are points of
contact that involve technics, a methodical search
for contact with the other, something external.
The question how to weigh the relationship
between the pathic moment of touch and the
technologies of touch now constitutes the chal-
lenge to thinking.
INTERFACE DESIGN
The representative logic of interfaces making use of
touch can be discerned on the basis of the pathic
moment of touch and the possibility of technologi-
cal supplementarity which is a structural part of it.
When we try to control and model the demar-
cation of boundaries within various contacts
technologically, the key word that appears is
feedback. In media-technological contexts the
viewpoint of feedback is usually technological in
the sense that the feedback is understood to take
place between starting points and goals as a
technological means. The fundamental prerequi-
site then turns out to be calibration, the adjust-
ment of precision and matching the starting points
with the goals. I might mention as an example the
robot da Vinci which enables surgery by means of
a three-dimensional image. Precision is sought
here by providing the computer-aided robotic
Digital finger
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hands a sense of touch that is comparable to and
even intensifies the feeling of holding the instru-
ments in one’s hand.59 Technological operations
reduce everything within their reach to this target
horizon where the interplay of touch and sight is
constituted in a new way. The situation arises
where the calibrated feedback begins to determine
the anticipation of goals and at the same time take
the points of departure for granted. New stan-
dards are set to the sensorium and its hierarchical
organisation. Some neuroscientists even suggest
that various technical devices, is so far as they
involve some form of sensory substitution, can be
considered at the same time as new sensory
modalities and as new tools.60
Today, as different sensations and faculties are
combined in new ways with the aid of computers,
some have even begun to talk about ‘‘a new
language of haptic sensations’’ whose structure
and tones interface designers polish by means of
user studies exploiting virtual prototypes.61 It
becomes evident in this context that touch is still
understood as a promise of immediacy. This feeds
the kind of haptic realism that attempts to fade out
the part played by technology: virtual objects are
expected to ‘‘feel real’’. As digitalisation spreads to
involve the entire body, the abyss of the figure of
the hand opening at the finger would seem to turn
the metonymic structure inside out, as it were, so
that the body becomes a metonymy of the
digitalised finger. Realism-seeking interface design
would thus not, in fact, only mean a simplification
of the skills required from the finger but requires
the body to be made to participate in the body’s
digital organisation. How to reflect on the hetero-
geneous field of touch on this reverse side of the
body?
Systems that are self-steering or self-organising
one way or the other may be identified in many
different fields. Feedback may equally well be
social, cognitive, affective, physical, chemical or
mechanical. Touch adds to this heterogeneous
field of couplings and contacts the dimension of
exposure and the questioning of boundaries.
Touch exposes the integrity of those who take
part in it. That is why it cannot be regarded as
merely something between starting points and
goals even in so-called ‘‘technical’’ contexts.
Touching involves a ‘‘testing’’ of the limits with
multifaceted modalities: contesting, detesting,
attesting, etc.
What is at stake is the experience of a limit
which is at the same time the limit of experience.62
Technics handles not only the question of what it
is to be human but also the boundaries of touch
itself. It is a question of how technology responds
to adversities and coincidences, pathic exposures.
According to Waldenfels, contemporary ‘‘hyper-
modern technology’’ which has been built into a
self-organising system, attempts to control even
randomness, become ‘‘pathic technology’’ and
‘‘turn pathos into poiesis’’. Yet when this happens,
something that remains beyond the reach of
technology begins to emerge.63 A number of
phenomena within life sciences and media tech-
nologies display particularly impressive looking
symptoms of this but are rather difficult to grasp
because of their complexity. By tracking these
symptoms we may bring forth the implications of
change that take place in the cultural status of
touch. I will conclude by taking up one point that
illustrates the re-articulation of touch and is
already showing interesting symptoms.
Dave Boothroyd has seized on Derrida’s ideas
that the philosophy of touch must avoid the
reproduction of haptocentrism, where we end up
if we set up touch as the thumb of a ‘‘full hand’’ of
the five senses. At the same time is must go via a
theory of the skin.64 Boothroyd suggests that we
regard different IT interfaces as an emergent skin,
which he describes by the term ‘‘inter(sur)face’’.65
However, he feels that the angle to this epipheno-
menal skin proves unnecessarily restricted if, for
example, it is built on neurophysiological explana-
tions. Boothroyd prefers to rely on Emmanuel
Levinas in whose thought the skin is more
fundamentally determined as an existential struc-
ture rather than based on its biological and
cultural functions alone.66
Following Derrida, Boothroyd argues that as
soon as touch is articulated as a technological
application field the angle is by definition hapto-
centric, because it is targeted to be a representa-
tion of touch.67 The only thing we get in our field
of vision is feedback that motivates interface
design and affirms recognition and which could
be called narsissistic feedback, because it forms in
its functionality a circle that feeds the sense of self-
power. Typically, the developers of multimodal
interfaces set as their goal not only the richness
and realism of sense feedback but also the pleasure
that the user can experience.68 The idea is to have
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everything related to the system smoothly to hand.
When this happens, the pathic moment of touch
and the ethical dimensions of feedback remain in a
dead angle. Boothroyd stresses pertinently that
the ethical implications of ‘‘sensory enhancement’’
are not restricted to the level of practices and
attitudes (in other words, the mediations of an
ethical relationship) but what is at stake are above
all the mechanisms of the constitution of an
ethical subject.69
Consequently, it is not essential from this
standpoint to study the virtues and shortcomings
of various touch-based devices and social net-
working interfaces but to ask, how they change
our experiential horizon or even disfigure the
figure of a horizon. If we want to understand the
data glove, it is not enough to put it on and reflect
on whether the hand is in the glove or the glove on
the hand*we must also turn it inside out. In our
thinking of touch, we must get on the reverse side
of the lived body, beyond the phenomenally
organised spatiality. This does not, however,
mean out-of-body experiences or the mystification
of the body. Nor does it mean turning touch into a
metaphor or making it concrete. The task is to
weigh the heterogeneous field of touch beyond
these supposedly opposing poles. The challenge is
to position the body in that field. If thought
relying on visual logic tends to ‘‘substantivate’’
and as a result conceive of things in terms of
concepts, and if ‘‘verbalizing’’ event-oriented
thought threatens to mystify the body, then the
heterogeneous field of touch tends to demand
contact-seeking ‘‘adjectival thinking’’.
This demand of tact implies that the constitu-
tion of an ethical subject must be considered in
relation to sentience, which, as Aristotle helped us
make evident, is related to the sensitivity of
thought. It is therefore not all the same in what
frames determined by what figures we make these
distinctions and on what structures we reproduce
them. Our techno skin, however, it may be
constituted, ought to be tactful. On the basis of
Aristotle, we must direct our thinking on the
pathic structure of touch that evades technological
control and at the core of which we find a gap or
suspension span. It is from this suspension span
and from the suspension of the span that touch is
constituted and not between pre-determined par-
ties. In other words, no contact surface can be
taken for granted, not even biological skin, the
material foundation of the sense of touch. We
must consider the heterogeneity and technicality
as constitutive of touch and take them as our point
of departure. Therefore, instead of focusing on
grasping, we must direct our thinking to the
friction between various contact points and facul-
ties. In other words, as a response to the ‘‘adjecti-
val’’ demand we must pay attention to the gaps
where the apparent immediacy of touch cracks
and the pathic exposures challenge the hapto-
centric conceptions of touching.
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